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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
Al-Gaddafi forces Military and security forces loyal to Colonel Mu'hammar al-Gaddafi 
BRICS   Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
ECHR   European Court of Human Rights 
GA   General Assembly 
GCIV   Fourth Geneva Convention 
HRW   Human Rights Watch 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICRC   International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
MIF   Multinational Interim Force 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OIC   Organization of the Islamic Conference 
OUP   Operation Unified Protector 
R2P   Responsibility to Protect 
SC   Security Council 
SCR   Security Council Resolution 
SSDF   Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
Thuwwar  Opposition fighters, literally means "revolutionaries" 
UN   United Nations 
USC   United Somali Congress 
VLCT   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and aim of this thesis 
The conflict in Libya between the opposition and regime supporters led to thousands of 
lives being lost.
1
 One of the roots to the humanitarian crisis was planted in Benghazi on 17 
February 2006. Cartoons portraying the prophet Mohammed were fuelling protests all over 
the Arab world. The Benghazi protest ended when security forces killed at least 12 people 
and injured scores of others. Five years after Benghazi a new wave of anti-government pro-
tests were powered by similar outrage in Tunisia and Egypt. After years of government 
oppression, the rage of the civilian population in Libya cumulated into a protest now direct-
ly aimed at Colonel Mu'ammar al-Gaddafi's regime. The new protest named the "Day of 
rage" was held on the five year anniversary of the previous one held in Benghazi. 
 
This peaceful protest was met by security forces using excessive and lethal force, causing 
numerous civilians to die while attempting to exercise their basic human rights. A snowball 
effect had begun which led to further and larger clashes throughout Libya. Between oppos-
ing sides stood innocent bystanders falling into the category of collateral damage by the 
thousands as the conflict intensified. Al-Gaddafi forces would target civilians and residen-
tial areas specifically with intent to kill, using mortar attacks and indiscriminate weapons 
such as cluster bombs and mines in their efforts to control the population. Extrajudicial 
executions of captives were not uncommon either throughout the conflict.   
 
On the other side, opposition fighters named the Thuwwar would also kidnap and torture 
those suspected of supporting the regime. At least a dozen were confirmed killed this way. 
It is therefore safe to say that unlawful acts were happening on both sides of the growing 
conflict. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 These and following facts were obtained through Amnesty International's (2011) report which is based on 
their fact-finding visits to Libya between 26 February and 28 May 2011. 
 3 
The OIC
2
 and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
3
 initially responded by 
both condemning the use of excessive force against civilians, respectively 22 and 23 Feb-
ruary 2011. The League of Arab States later called on the SC to impose a no-fly zone over 
Libya to prevent further loss of civilian lives.
4 
These responses came from states and organ-
izations tied closest to Libya both territorially and politically, and gave the international 
community grounds for concern. 
 
Following the Arab League's recommendation the SC adopted resolution 1970 on 26 Feb-
ruary 2011.
5
 It imposed an arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze and referred the matter to 
the ICC. Most of these non-military measures soon proved inadequate and were shortly 
after expanded to the use of "all necessary measures" by resolution 1973 on 17 March 
2011.
6
 Preventing attacks on the civilian population was the main purpose behind its adop-
tion. A precondition for such authorization is a legal matter since certain conditions found 
in Chapter VII of the UN Charter must be met before such powers are made available. The 
powers to both decide when these conditions are met and authorize adequate action belongs 
solely to the SC.   
 
The on-going conflict in Libya clearly amounted to a humanitarian disaster with a wide 
range of negative consequences towards both active and non-active participants to the con-
flict. A question remaining in the aftermath concerns the legality of the authorization. Did 
these consequences suffice to regard the Chapter VII conditions as met? The relevance of 
such a question is high if one views the conflict in Libya as a purely internal matter, con-
sidering the Charter's main purpose is to secure international peace.
7
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4
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7
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 4 
Secondly, a question of coalition forces staying within their mandate must also be dis-
cussed when taking into account that others have viewed these actions as going beyond the 
authorization, and thus being unlawful.
 8
 Examining these two principal questions is the 
main goal of this thesis. 
 
Before moving on to these questions, the framework of which these questions will be an-
swered in must first be outlined. Historical complexity and blameworthiness naturally fall 
outside this scope. Facts will be gathered from notable human rights organisations and pre-
sumed correct for this purpose. Since international law provides many a tool and alternative 
ways of interpretation, precision and context is of high importance. Defining the methods 
used will be the first step to ensure one understands the specific context of which these 
questions will be answered.  
 
1.2 Methods 
To be able to answer questions of legality, interpreting and applying the correct rule of law 
is essential. The scope of the law for these questions is found by interpreting the UN Char-
ter, relevant SCR's and international humanitarian law (IHL). However, since the Charter 
and SCR's differ from ordinary treaties in both creation and content, they warrant a further 
discussion towards the applicability of ordinary interpretational rules. The customary rules 
of treaty interpretation codified through the Vienna Convention
9
 are those usually applied 
to ordinary treaties, hence the question to answer is whether or not the principles also apply 
to these instruments due to their unique character. 
 
                                                 
 
8
 Ulfstein G, Christiansen Hege E. The Legality of the NATO bombings in Libya. Forthcoming 
9
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 5 
1.2.1 Principles of treaty Interpretation  
The UN Charter was mainly formulated by politicians and its wording has a broad and gen-
eral approach.
10
 What really sets the Charter apart from ordinary treaties is its constitutive 
element. It is similar to a state's constitution with regards to build up and complexity, but 
packaged in the form of a treaty and is said to contain elements of both a traité-contrat and 
traité-loi.
11
  
 
One cannot hide the fact that the Charter represents an unprecedented agreement with huge 
consequences if it were to be wrongfully interpreted, and to have interpretive authority over 
the Charter creates "considerable power".
12
 An important aspect of its interpretation is the 
fact that authoritative power is not assigned a single entity within the UN body, though its 
day to day application lies in the hands of the ICJ, SC, GA and other subsidiary bodies of 
the UN.
13
   
 
Article 5 of the VCLT states the convention applies to "any treaty which is the constituent 
instrument of an international organization…". The Charter clearly falls within this defini-
tion, but since the Charter was concluded before the VCLT entered into force in 1969, the 
rules are not directly applicable as stated in Art. 4. Although non-retroactive, Articles 31-
33 are still regarded as customary rules and applicable to any treaty in principle, including 
the Charter. This argument is also strengthened by the Statute of the ICJ as Art. 38(b) states 
that customary law shall be applied to the disputes submitted to it. This would include the 
customary rules found in Articles 31-33 in the VCLT.  But there are scholars who still ar-
                                                 
 
10
 Schweigman (2001) p. 19 
11
 The former referring to its contractual nature, the latter to its law-making capacity. Rosenne (1989) pp. 
182-184  
12
 Schwindt (2000) p. 199 
13
 ibid. p. 200 
 6 
gue the Charter resembles more of a constitution than of a treaty and that these customary 
rules therefore do not apply.
14
  
 
A less rigid approach has Shaw who does not necessarily deny the applicability of Articles 
31-33, but is in favour of a more flexible interpretational approach when saying: 
"The special nature of the constituent instruments as forming not only multilateral agreements but 
also constitutional documents subject to constant practice, and thus interpretation, both of the intui-
tion itself and of member-states and others in relation to it. This of necessity argues for a more flexi-
ble or purpose orientated method of interpretation."
15
 
 
By arguing necessity for a more "flexible" or "purpose" oriented method, he shows the 
Charter has the potential of evolving. This is a development which should be taken into 
consideration in an interpretational process. 
 
Kahgan has a more specific aim of the interpretation when expressing the goal should be to 
find the "intent" behind the provision by examining the travaux preparatories, the intention 
of the parties and the objects and purpose of the text.
16 
One problem with Kahgan's ap-
proach is that she does not consider that the original intention might be obsolete after 67 
years. Skubiszewski therefore points out "the intention of the present majority cannot be 
explained on the basis of what was said in San Francisco."
17
 And when one considers the 
post WW2 context of the Charter's adoption, this argument is obviously true. 
 
Following Kahgan's thought, an argument could be made that new members to the UN are 
bound by the previous legal documents, including the travaux preparatoires, but this view 
appears to be too legalistic today.
18
 I therefore agree with Schweigman who reasons the 
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 7 
intent of the original parties has lessened in weight and subsequent practice accordingly has 
become more important.
19
   
 
In conclusion there are arguments both in favour and against the applicability of the cus-
tomary rules of treaty interpretation. Schweigman concludes "Emphasis should be placed 
on the object and purpose of the organization", and I agree this is not a question of whether 
the rules themselves apply or not, but of their individual weight when interpreting.
 20 
After 
all, this is not a purely automatic operation but a process.
21
  
 
Recognising the unique character of the UN through both origin and position, the custom-
ary rules are still a good starting point, but with different shades of importance in compari-
son to how one would interpret ordinary treaties. These rules will therefore be used as in-
terpretational aids, but not regarded as exhaustive or as blueprints when interpreting the 
Charter.  
 
1.2.2 Principles of interpreting Security Council resolutions 
Before the application of any interpretational rule, the terms of the SCR's must first be de-
cided.
22
 They usually consist of numbered paragraphs, preambles and sometimes annexes. 
After this decision is made, the natural follow up is to ask what rules are available to inter-
pret them, and can these rules be applied in full? These questions have generally been giv-
en little attention.
23
 Because resolutions are not treaties, there is a wide consensus that the 
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 8 
VCLT cannot be directly applied, but can the same principles be applied by analogy?
24
 
This is a question of great importance and answering it is the aim of this discussion.
25
 
 
The principal judicial authority on interpreting SCR's was the ICJ's Namibia Advisory 
Opinion: 
"The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion 
can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question 
whether they have been in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of 
the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in gen-
eral, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the 
Security council".
26
 
 
However, this opinion had no immediate reference to the VCLT and the issue at hand was 
also to the "binding effects" of SCR's and not a general interpretational approach. Wood's 
says even though this is the case, it does offer "some guidance" to general issues.
27
 From 
the section we see the court regards "all circumstances" as an important tool in deciding its 
meaning. Even the "speeches" hold value which is traditionally regarded as a supplemen-
tary means of interpretation and secondary to the wording. Wood's brings up three main 
points
28
 to consider when interpreting SCR's:
 
 
1) The preambles may be useful but should be treated with caution as they sometimes are dumping 
grounds for proposals not acceptable in a paragraphs form. 
2) The SCR's may be part of a series and must only be understood as such. 
3) The uncertainty of the publications authoritativeness.  
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 9 
In comparison to treaty interpretation, the preamble is given less weight and the document 
itself must also be interpreted in the light of previous and later resolutions to get the correct 
context, and thereof the intention behind it.  The wideness of the approach is seemingly the 
most significant difference from ordinary treaty interpretation.   
 
A newer view on this question came with the ICJ's advisory opinion on Kosovo when it 
stated: 
"Before continuing further, the Court must recall several factors relevant in the interpretation of reso-
lutions of the Security Council. While the rules on treaty interpretation embodied in Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may provide guidance, differences between Se-
curity Council resolutions and treaties mean that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions 
also require that other factors be taken into account. Security Council resolutions are issued by a sin-
gle, collective body and are drafted through a very different process than that used for the conclusion 
of a treaty. Security Council resolutions are the product of a voting process as provided for in Article 
27 of the Charter, and the final text of such resolutions represents the view of the Security Council as 
a body. Moreover, Security Council resolutions can be binding on all Member States […] irrespec-
tive of whether they played any part in their formulation. The interpretation of Security Council reso-
lutions may require the Court to analyse statements by representatives of members of the Security 
Council made at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council on the same is-
sue, as well as the subsequent practice of relevant United Nations organs and of States affected by 
those given resolutions."
29
  
 
The ICJ's viewpoint being that even though the VCLT "may provide guidance", one cannot 
settle with this approach as "other factors" must also be taken into account. It inter alia 
points to their principal difference of character, and specifically the lacking element of con-
sent which sets SCR's apart from treaties and their contractual element. A much wider in-
terpretational approach has also the ECHR done, when they in Al-Jedda v. The United 
Kingdom said they relied on the advisory opinion on Namibia as guidance.
30
 The im-
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 ICJ, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo 
(2010), para 94. 
30
 Al-Jedda v. The United Kingdom para. 76 
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portance of considering a "wide range" of factors is evident. This judgement also came 
after the Kosovo opinion. 
 
Concluding on how to answer this question is no easy task. Wood's uses tentative conclu-
sions in his last passages to help find a method of interpretation. One of these conclusions 
is to aim for the intention of the Council expressed through their resolutions, but interpreted 
in the context of the UN Charter.
31
 The tools needed for achieving this goal could naturally 
be based on the treaty rules but one should not have a goal of applying them all, as this is 
"highly artificial"
32
 considering their distinctive attributes. The difference between the gen-
eral and supplementary rules of interpretation also has less significance here.
33
  
 
Larsen says this question has not been fully answered yet, though the aim should also be to 
find the SC's intention.
34
 When used as guidance towards finding the intention the VCLT 
holds value, but one must always bear in mind the differences of character which SCR's 
possess when applying these rules analogically.
35
 Therefore, an interpretational approach 
with these finer points in mind will be applied in the following. 
 
1.3 The relationship between legality and judicial review 
A valid objection to the principal questions regards their importance. Why should these 
questions be examined when the SC solely decide and execute appropriate measures. 
Malanczuk expressed a similar concern by saying "a threat to the peace seems to be what-
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33
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34
 Larsen (2012) p. 367 
35
 l.c 
 11 
ever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace."
36
   Unlawful acts in this context are 
also rarely pursued. By their exterior these questions undoubtedly seem to hold little value.  
 
What must first be said to this objection is that the reasons in favour of examining these 
questions far outweigh the ones opposing it. Even though the ICJ has jurisdiction to con-
sider the legality of resolutions, it rarely gets to use its powers. The reality being there is no 
actual judicial review, which shows the importance of determining the legal status of these 
resolutions. For the subjects involved this is also important because a determination can 
create acceptance or reassurance one way or the other. And even though these lines seem 
hazy at times, especially when dealing with international law, the sole principle of seeking 
out such answers holds importance and value in itself. 
 
Since resolutions 1970 and 1973 are both exceptions to the main principles of non-
intervention in states, placing them in context is important to get a broadened perspective 
and knowledge of their origin. This calls for a systematic approach beginning with the main 
rules before narrowing down the focus to the exceptions and the principal questions. Chap-
ter two will therefore outline the basic frame surrounding these resolutions. 
 
2 The main principles of non-intervention 
2.1 State sovereignty 
A state's territorial integrity and political independence is a key principle inter alia in inter-
national law. It is found expressed in the UN Charter Art. 2(4) but is also regarded as inter-
national customary law, making it binding for all states. The article has been described as 
"the corner-stone of the Charter system".
37
 Simply put, it forbids the use or threat of force 
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between states. The term "force" does not cover all types of force, but is limited to "armed 
force" because its main purpose is war-preventing.
38
 
 
One must further note that this provision has an international element and the use or threat 
of force within a state is not covered (e.g. civil war), only force between states. By using 
the terms "territorial integrity" and "political independence", the provision shows that it 
covers all types of trans-border use of force and not limited to states trying to deprive each 
other of territory.
39
 
 
This principle is supplemented by Art. 2(7) which prohibits the UN from getting involved 
in a state's domestic affairs. However, this rule deals with the UN exclusively, non-
interference from "states" fall outside its scope.
40
 This is also the only general ratione ma-
teriae limit of the Charter.
41
 Intervention in this context means those powers given to them 
by the Charter
42
 while matters that fall within a state's "domestic affairs" are those who are 
"free from international obligations."
43
 This means that matters without trans-border impli-
cations potentially fall outside the UN's jurisdiction.
44
 As shown in the last sentence of Art. 
2(7), the principle shall not prejudice the application of Chapter VII measures, showing that 
the exceptions found in Chapter VII are fully applicable but on matters outside of a state's 
domestic affairs, thus limiting the powers of the SC. 
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2.2 General exceptions 
There are two main exceptions to the prohibition of force principle. A case for a third can 
be made with regards to the R2P doctrine but will be covered in the next subchapter. The 
first exception to Art. 2(4) is the rule of individual or collective self-defence found in Art. 
51. However, this exception is not applicable to the conflict in Libya as it was not related to 
self-defence within the scope of Art. 51. It is therefore not relevant to this thesis. Here, the 
relevant exceptions from Art. 2(4) supplemented by 2(7) are those found in Chapter VII of 
the Charter. 
  
The member states have in accordance with Art. 24(1) given the SC the primary responsi-
bility for maintaining international peace and security. The SC prima facie determines in 
accordance with Art. 39 if one of three alternative conditions is met. These are either (1) 
"threat to the peace", (2) "breach of the peace" or (3) "act of aggression." Resolutions 1970 
and 1973 concerned themselves solely with a "threat to the peace".   
 
If one of these three alternative conditions are found to be met, and peaceful means are still 
regarded as adequate measures then Art. 41 can be applied. This article focuses on non-
forceful measures e.g. the interruption of economic relations or the severance of diplomatic 
relations. The measures which are exemplified in the article are not exhaustive. Oosthuizen 
has said "this requirement could be linked to the concept of good faith and abuse of 
rights"
45
, meaning there could be limitations even to the use of non-forceful measures, as 
well as the ordinary limitations that follow use of force. Resolution 1970
46
 was adopted by 
the SC to deploy non-forceful steps as mentioned in the introduction. 
 
If the SC view peaceful measures as inadequate or they have previously proven to have 
failed, they can give a resolution permitting the use of force in accordance with Art. 42.  
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The SC changed its view towards Libya only days after passing resolution 1970. It subse-
quently adopted resolution 1973
47
 as a response to the escalating conflict.  The introduction 
brings up the question of the conflict possibly being regarded as an internal matter. If an-
swered positive one must ask if an internal matter can be a "threat to the peace"? Article 
2(7) which forbids interventions in "matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction" could then also be violated. The applicability of this condition will be discussed 
in Chapter three. 
 
2.3 R2P (Responsibility to protect) - a third exception? 
The R2P was "borne out of frustration"
48
 as an answer to the unwillingness of states to act 
on crimes of mass atrocity, particularly in Rwanda and Kosovo.
49
 "The essence of the R2P 
is that sovereignty implies responsibility."
50
 This is a shift in the debate from the previous 
concept of humanitarian intervention, moving away from state sovereignty synonymously 
meaning control to a concept where sovereignty now means responsibility, including a re-
sponsibility to protect.
51
 
 
In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document the meaning was conveyed and the General 
Assembly adopted this motion.
52
 It specified that the R2P doctrine consists of three pil-
lars.
53
  The first regards the individual responsibility each state has to protect its population 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second pil-
lar deals with the international community's collective responsibility to support and aid 
such states by peaceful means when one of the four crimes occur. The fail-safe found in the 
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third pillar addresses the collective responsibility to take action in accordance with Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter when diplomatic measures prove or seem inadequate. The commis-
sion did not exclude that also other organs of the UN and even regional organizations could 
exercise the R2P.
54
  
 
A question needed to be answered concerns its legal status. It is highly controversial 
whether the R2P "is a hard and fast legal obligation, only a political concept, soft law, or an 
emerging legal norm."
55
 Five nations have already stated they do not regard the R2P as a 
binding norm, but a concept.
56
 On the other hand we have Canada who called it a "sophisti-
cated normative legal framework based on international law." 
57
 Bangladesh chose a mid-
dle way when saying it was an emerging normative framework..."
58
 This shows there is no 
international consensus between states on the question. 
 
The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General stated: “[I]t is a political, not legal, concept 
based on well-established international law and the provisions of the UN Charter.”59 Saying 
the doctrine is based on international law but not regarded as law is also how Peters con-
cludes, when she says it is a novel construct built on pre-existing legal principles.
60
 Thus, 
the concept is still to be regarded a "mere concept" but with some added legal value be-
cause it was drafted and based on international legal principles. This is also the understand-
ing that will be used here. In the next chapter, the basis for using force within Libya will 
first be outlined by interpreting Article 39 of the Charter. 
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3 Legal basis for resolutions 1970 and 1973 
3.1 UN Charter Article 39 
This article is a prerequisite for both non-military measures and use of force and states: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accord-
ance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." 
 
The relevant condition concerning resolutions 1970 and 1973 is a "threat to the peace" 
which the SC in resolution 1973 said the situation in Libya continued to be.
61
 The SC has 
interpreted this condition for almost 70 years and one could argue there is nothing more to 
interpret at this stage. But this does not change the fact that the wording is still the main 
legal basis for SC authorization. And to see if the SC has acted within its legal limits, the 
wording must be first be interpreted and its findings applied to their positive acts. This will 
show if there is in fact a discrepancy between their actual legal powers and the adoption of 
these resolutions. 
 
Neither of the conditions in Art. 39 are defined in the charter. The travaux preparatories 
suggests this was done deliberately, leaving us to fall back on the principles of treaty inter-
pretation.
62
 The starting point is therefore to interpret a "threat to the peace" in "good faith" 
and in accordance with the "ordinary meaning" and in the "light of its object and pur-
pose."
63
   
 
The first step is to divide the condition and interpret each of its words, beginning with the 
ordinary meaning of "peace" which is "notoriously relative and subjective".
64
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3.1.1 "Peace" 
To find the ordinary meaning of a word, the dictionary is the natural starting point. The 
Oxford dictionary defines "peace" as:  
"freedom from, or cessation of, war or hostilities."
65
  
 
The dictionary's definition is broad and seems to cover most situations containing a mini-
mum level of aggression. This could be characterised as a negative definition of peace.
66
 
However, recent SC practice shows that "peace" is now regarded in a more positive man-
ner, making it questionable if this minimum level suffices.
67
 Conforti says the tendency 
now is to view peace as "political, social and economic circumstances that obstruct the ris-
ing of future conflicts."
68
 This evolution shows that peace cannot merely be viewed as the 
freedom from of war, but as a much wider concept. But it may still be assumed that "peace" 
means the absence of organized force in Chapter VII and this is the conclusion here.
69
 The 
next word being a "threat" is described as "the broadest and most indistinct concept in Art. 
39 …".70 
 
3.1.2 "Threat" 
The word "threat" is defined as: 
"A declaration of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage or other punishment in retribution for 
something done or not done."
71
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The wording implies the threat needs not to have led to any sort of manifested damage, but 
the intention of such damage must be apparent at the time the threat is put forth. An im-
pending armed conflict between states is the classic case to fit the bill.
72
 One could argue 
this condition is no longer met when the damage actually manifests itself considering it has 
then moved beyond being a mere "threat". 
 
The alternative conditions in Art. 39 of "act of aggression" and "breach of the peace" seem 
better suited for those situations. Though the wording seems limiting, the SC has in fact 
found on-going conflicts to represent a "threat to the peace" and consequently blurred the 
distinction.
73
 Another problem with the wording is it gives no exact answer to the degree of 
probability that must exist.
74
 
 
A "threat" under Art. 2(4) has been described by the ICJ as "a declared readiness of a state 
to use force."
75
 Even though this is not directly transferable as it does not regard the inter-
pretation of Art. 39 itself, it still indicates how the condition could be regarded and sup-
ports an interpretation based on its ordinary meaning. The "readiness" of a state closely 
resembling the part of intent to cause damage.  
 
A pure textual interpretation of the words "peace" and "threat" has now been done. There is 
still a significant element left to be discussed, an element not visible when solely focusing 
on the wording itself. The Charter must be read as a whole and applying this view the next 
step. 
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3.1.3 "International" 
The Charter being an international instrument means both content and execution thrives on 
building international relations, trans-border cooperation and preventing wars. When this is 
the broader context, interpretational findings must be applied within an international light 
to be in conformity with the Charter.  This is clear when reading Art.1(1) with its goal of 
"international peace", 2(3) about resolving "international disputes", and 2(4) dealing with 
"international relations". The preamble also emphasizes the goal of maintaining "interna-
tional peace". This means one must read a "threat" as being towards the "international 
peace", and not just the "peace" itself as Art. 39 read out of context might imply. But what 
is the meaning of "international peace"?  
 
At first glance the wording immediately leads one to think of inter-state conflicts, and dis-
regard purely internal matters as the Charter prescribes through Art. 2(7).  Lepard on the 
other hand brings up the question of whether "international peace" can be read with a 
broader viewpoint, which would include peace within state borders as well as across bor-
ders.
76
 He calls this a "holistic definition".
77
  
 
One argument in favour of a holistic definition is Art. 1(2) which aims for "universal 
peace". This could be as Lepard writes an implication of peace both within and between 
states.
78
 A second argument in favour is the Charter read as a whole, which shows a con-
cern for peace and human rights "within all countries…".79 Against this a strong principle 
of non-intervention in internal affairs still resides on firm grounds with Art. 2(7).  Lepard 
argues that even though this is true, it would "at the very least" seem to "cast doubt" on the 
matter with the arguments above.
80
 An argument could perhaps be made that the wording 
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of 2(7) stating that matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" does not expressly 
rule out that an internal matter could be regarded as a threat to the international peace.  
 
Summarizing these arguments it would appear that though questionable, the stronger textu-
al support based on the international element present throughout the Charter lies in the tra-
ditional definition, which implies the threat must to some degree have border crossing po-
tential.   
 
3.1.4 Partial conclusions 
There are two potential problems with this textual interpretation. The first regards the defi-
nition of a threat as a "declaration of an intention". Because the Charter's purpose is to pre-
vent threats to the international peace, no intent to create harm can be required as it could 
endanger such a purpose. A "risk of harm" seems more precise in the light of the Charter's 
main object and purpose.  
 
Secondly you have the part of retribution. Here there must be a link between the threat and 
previous acts or omissions. Although most threats are based on previous acts, this does not 
automatically mean they all are. By applying such a narrow interpretational approach, the 
room for action might be considered too small and unrealistic on an international scale.  
When taking into consideration these concerns, the following textual interpretation is left: 
"A risk of harm beyond the borders of a host state towards the absence of organized force within a 
receiving state."   
 
One cannot settle solely with a textual interpretation as this is only regarded the first step of 
many in an interpretational process. As subsequent practice is gaining more weight as an 
interpretational factor, this must be further examined as expressed through VCLT Art. 
31(3)(b). The subsequent practice being important for two main reasons: The first to see 
how the SC itself practices and understands the provision, while the second is to see if the 
wording has evolved since its initial ratification.  
 21 
3.2 Subsequent Security Council practice 
In resolution 1973 the SC e.g. expressed a "grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the 
escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties" in Libya. The following situations 
have all been found to meet the requirement of being a "threat to the peace" and are chosen 
due to their similarities with Libya regarding grave humanitarian concerns.  
 
It is a fact that the SC though acting under Chapter VII does not always "determine" a 
threat to the peace but use different wordings as substitutes. The word "concerned" accom-
panied by "gravely or deeply" was formally used on Iraq
81
, Somalia
82
 and Yugoslavia.
 83
 
The reason for this says Chesterman is: 
"though imprecise, these resolutions were all adopted in the early years of the recent period of inter-
ventionism – it may not be an exaggeration to suggest that the Council was still experimenting with 
its new found powers."
84
  
 
He argues the intent to determine the situation as a "threat to the peace" was there, though 
formally expressed through different words, and this will also be assumed in the following.  
 
Before SCR's 1970 and 1973 the Libya conflict as mentioned could have been regarded an 
internal conflict only, and since the textual interpretation supports regarding such situations 
as being outside the scope of a "threat to the peace", the question to answer is if a "threat to 
the peace" can cover more than merely inter-state conflicts based on the SC's practice. 
 
An interesting opening observation in this light is the Tadic case where the ICTY obiter 
dicta in para. 30 stated that a conflict can be considered a threat to the peace, even though 
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regarded an internal conflict only with regards to settled practice of the Security Council.
85
 
Though this might be considered a bold statement, the ICTY consists of legal scholars from 
all over the world whose opinion has legal relevance. How much weight one should assign 
such opinions is a different question. This must at least be interpreted as an indication on 
how a highly ranked judicial body has viewed the SC practice over the last years. It should 
also be noted that this opinion was voiced in 1995, which is after the adoption of most of 
the resolutions discussed in the following with some exceptions.  
 
3.2.1 Iraq 
As a result of Saddam Hussein's repression of the civilian population in Iraq, the SC adopt-
ed resolution 688 in 1991 condemning and urging the international community to take im-
mediate action through humanitarian relief. A "threat to the peace" was found met and rea-
soned by "a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and cross 
border incursions."
86
 Orakhelashvili points out that the reasoning was not based on the re-
pression itself, but the "consequences" of the repression as shown in operative paragraph 1 
of the resolution.
87
  
 
There are two alternative reasons behind the resolution. This view is also strengthened by 
the use of the plural verb "threaten."
88
 There is a "refugee argument" and a "cross border 
incursions" argument. The second reason is difficult to address since the rationale behind 
seems vague and lacking. The following focus will therefore be towards the refugee argu-
ment. 
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A question of the level of threat in which these refugees possess must first be addressed. A 
point here is the fact that there was no manifested harm to the receiving states at the time of 
the resolution, only the risk. And receiving refugees cannot be characterised as a threat to a 
state's peace in the classical sense. This is pushing the "threat" spectre.  
 
Yemen and Zimbabwe also argued this way by saying the refugee argument was only a 
cover to intervene in Iraq's domestic jurisdiction.
89
 The lacking threat level is apparent if 
one regards refugees in the typical sense, as people who mainly seek peace from hostilities 
and war in their home states, and who do not actively pursue the direct opposite. But the 
amount of refugees here (regarded as "massive") could arguably create tensions and hostili-
ties in the receiving states. And such tensions and hostilities could strengthen over time if 
care and protection were to be lacking.   
 
Whether "refugee hostilities" could amount to a "threat to the peace" in Iraq's neighbouring 
states is a doubtful question. The short answer is yes, they could possibly possess such a 
threat over time, but not immediately. Since there was no concrete evidence of the refugees 
being an immediate threat, a strong argument in the favour of regarding the wording of a 
"threat to the peace" as being stretched can be made.  
 
This was the first time the SC had accepted that an "internal repression" could have "trans-
boundary effects."
90
 Notwithstanding the most controversial and least supported resolution 
on Iraq with ten votes to three.
91
 Its biggest problem is seemingly the fact that it was not 
applied under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution does not say it was applied under 
Chapter VII and British officials have also admitted to this fact.
92
 Its overall value must be 
regarded as limited when taking this into consideration. 
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Another problem says Welsh is the fact that the resolution would not have secured the nec-
essary votes if it was to be based purely on humanitarian grounds. She argues in favour of 
this view because the six-non permanent members who voted for it did not want to set any 
precedent as portrayed through their speeches.
93
 A last and final point could be to put a spin 
on the traditional rights in customary law of victories states and view these resolutions as a 
product of such rights.
94
 Victor's after all have a responsibility and say in the aftermath of 
war. 
 
Schrijever on the other hand notes that the self-determination of the Kurdish people and 
protection of them lead to the situation being "international".
95
 This could of course give 
the resolutions firmer grounds but can hardly justify the resolution alone. Orakhelashvili 
would also disagree with this view as he does not regard the repression itself but the conse-
quences as a reason behind its adoption. 
 
Concluding that a massive flow of refugees is a "threat to the peace" is both difficult and 
questionable. On the other hand, the majority of the SC did not intend to base this resolu-
tion purely on humanitarian grounds, though the resolution itself appears to be evidence of 
the contrary. The fact remains that it did not get applied under Chapter VII and this seems 
to be one of the decisive elements of its acceptance. But if nothing else, a resolution not 
intended to be based purely on humanitarian grounds could perhaps be seen as evidence of 
a slight change in attitude towards willingness in doing so, especially when its content 
points that way.  
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3.2.2 Yugoslavia 
Violent tensions between different ethnic groups, underlined by cultural and political dif-
ferences led to the Yugoslavian wars between the years 1991-2001. The wars were between 
those republics seeking independence on the one side and the Belgrade government want-
ing to still keep control on the other.   
 
Article 2(7) was given a "prominent role" by the majority of SC members who considered 
the tensions of being an internal affair for a considerable amount of time.
 96
 Resolution 713 
changed this when it imposed an arms-embargo under Chapter VII "for the purposes of 
establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia."
97
 The background being as stated in the 
preamble that "heavy loss of human life and material damage" and by "consequences for 
the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries." 
Only Yugoslavia's consent to the resolution avoided a Chinese veto
98
, though this did not 
change the fact that the resolution had still to be determined under Art. 39.
99
 
 
A divided reasoning seems to be behind the resolution. The first regarding the heavy loss of 
human life and the second being the threat to the neighbouring states. Concentrating on the 
border argument, Chesterman assumes this to be minor at best and says one can argue that 
this is an example of the SC intervening in a purely domestic matter.
100
  
 
What might weaken Chesterman's argument is the fact that we are now dealing with a 
much more volatile and aggressive situation in comparison to Iraq. The heightened level of 
aggression is a key difference.
101
 The risk towards the peace of the region was arguably 
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higher in Yugoslavia than basing it solely on the flow of refugees as in Iraq. Similar views 
were held by the Soviet Union and United Kingdom "because it had 'spill over' effects" and 
was therefore a matter of "international concern."
102
 
 
Another point that must be discussed is the importance of consent. Did consent affect the 
adoption?  Manusama says though regarded a civil war, it was based on the possible influ-
ence on the peace of the region and consent was therefore redundant.
103
 Based on these 
arguments the following conclusion is we still have no significant departure from the tradi-
tional approach to the "threat to the peace" condition.
104
  
 
In the later resolution 827, the SC expressed the following: 
"its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violations of international humani-
tarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially in the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings, massive organised and systematic deten-
tion and rape of women, and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing", including for the 
acquisition and the holding of territory."
105
  
 
Once again determining the situation continued to threaten the peace, reasoned by breaches 
of humanitarian law "within the territory." At this point, new separate states were recog-
nized by the UN and the conflict could therefore not only be seen as having the potential of 
reaching other borders but actually being between states. Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were admitted members to the UN on 22 May 1992.
106
 In other words, the 
internal conflict was now regarded an intra-state conflict. This is clearly shown in the 
wording by using the phrase: "territory of the former Yugoslavia".   
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3.2.3 Somalia 
A coup d'état by Mohammed Siad Barre led a single party controlling Somalia and move-
ments like the USC and SSDF were quickly formed as a response. These clan based 
movements soon battled for control and civil war broke out.
107
 The civil war in Somalia led 
to numerous SC resolutions but 733 adopted in 1992 confirmed the humanitarian disaster 
now had reached a level that "threatened the peace". This was reasoned by "heavy loss of 
human life" and "widespread material damage" that could have consequences on the "sta-
bility and peace in the region."
108
  
 
The Secretary General of the UN reported in accordance with paragraph 10 of the resolu-
tion the following:  
"The conflict has threatened the instability of the Horn of Africa and its continuation has occasioned 
threats to international peace and security in the area. The countries in the region- Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya and the Sudan, some more than others, are beset by problems that are largely common to all. 
As a result, the exacerbation of conflict in one of the countries of the region could have serious re-
percussions in one or more of the others."
109
   
 
The SC viewed the conflict to have border crossing potential, but why? No refugee argu-
ment was used as justification this time. Chesterman argues this might have been a relevant 
"consequence" even if it wasn't formally expressed.
110
 The Secretary General's report post 
resolution could neither be used since it was not available at the time of the adoption. One 
could ask if the real rationale behind the resolution was concealed because only by con-
firming that the region could be impacted, could the SC sanction measures preventing fur-
ther loss of lives. The following resolution may have answered this question.  
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Resolution 794
111
 was one of many subsequent to 733 and reaffirmed the previous ones e.g. 
The ground breaking part of it was the fact that the SC now determined the human tragedy 
itself as a threat to the international peace and security and sanctioned the use of "all neces-
sary means".  This is clear departure from the definition and shows a new line of interpreta-
tion with less emphasis on the trans-border effects and increasingly more to the suffer-
ing.
112
 In response to the later resolution 814 which expanded the presence of UN forces, 
the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called it the first time the U.N had used force for "ex-
clusively, humanitarian, internal reasons" as quoted in O'Connell.
113
 
 
When trying to distinguish the Somali situation from others, two words in resolution 733 
stand out: "unique character". This makes the argument for an exception from the main 
principles rather than the beginning of a new norm. Roberts argues the intervention was 
"not a case of intervention against the will of government, but of intervention when there is 
a lack of government."
114
 He further points to the fact that it could have been justified in 
the terms of a "long standing proposition in international law" that allows for an interven-
tion when a "state collapses".
115
 His point can therefore be seen as justification on an alter-
native basis and therefor acceptable even though formally executed through Chapter VII.  
 
As we summarize arguments in favour and against, it is apparent that the SC went beyond 
the traditional approach to a "threat to the peace" and intended to do so with the wording in 
these resolutions. The difficult part is to extract any certainties or principles from them be-
cause of the unique situation in Somalia. When no government exists, neither can consent, 
leaving the international community with very few options. These resolutions can therefore 
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not stand their ground independently but must be used as a foundation and be built on by 
similar SC interpretations for them to be accepted as a new direction. 
 
3.2.4 Rwanda 
The genocide of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu population led to hundreds of thousands of 
deaths but the SC never sanctioned military intervention to stop the genocide. Resolution 
918 determined that the situation constituted a "threat to the peace and security in the re-
gion." There is no clear reasoning behind this determination in the resolution itself so one 
must first interpret it, and then view it in context in the hopes of finding these grounds.   
 
It clearly condemns "numerous killings of civilians" and violations of humanitarian law, 
which is a point in favour of saying the reasoning was to some extent based on humanitari-
an grounds. Österdahl says "it was clear that there was indeed a massive flow of refu-
gees to the neighbouring countries, primarily to Zaire."116 Again we see the refugee 
argument surface as possible grounds for an intervention. This argument could possibly 
be linked to the wording, though a weak one when it stated that the SC was "concerned 
that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to the peace and 
security in the region"117 Uncertainty still fills the air to the extent it might have impact-
ed the resolution directly.  
 
A point which Chesterman brings up is the fact that the above mentioned arguments do 
not belong to part B of the resolution where the SC actually applied Chapter VII and 
imposed an arms embargo.118 In part B they "merely determined" the situation consti-
tuted a threat to peace and security without elaborating on why. This could diminish the 
value of the humanitarian argument. One could argue that would humanitarian grounds 
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be the real reasoning, the SC would have stated it clearly in part B as well. On the other 
hand, the concerns had already been aired through the operational paragraphs and there-
fore not needed to be reiterated.  
 
In the subsequent resolution 929 the SC determined the "magnitude of the humanitarian 
crisis in Rwanda constituted a threat to the peace and security in the region." Here it is 
clear that the humanitarian crisis was the reason for a potentially trans boundary con-
flict. There is no mentioning of refugees as reasoning. And since the level of aggression 
towards other states regarding an internal conflict is small, it shows how the "threat" 
condition is applied on areas outside its ordinary scope.  
 
In comparison to other conflicts, its reasoning seems closer to Iraq than Somalia or Yu-
goslavia, even though the SC stated that the situation in Rwanda also constituted a 
"unique case."119 This is because the conflict did not contain the same level of aggres-
sion as seen in Yugoslavia, nor did alternative grounds exist for implementing measures 
as in Somalia. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the SC had in fact 
stretched the wording.  
 
3.2.5 Haiti 
A violent uprising against the rule of now former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
fueled by years of human rights abuse. After serving two terms and failing to deliver on 
previous promises, the opposition coalition known as the Democratic Platform of Civil 
Society and Political Parties had refused to comprise with the president and demanded his 
resignation.
120
 As no comprise was reached, an insurrection begun which in the end led to a 
coup d'état.  
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An international response came through resolution 1529 where the SC determined that the 
situation continued to threaten the peace.
121
 This inter alia led to the immediate deploy-
ment of MIF forces. To understand why the situation "continued" to threaten to peace, an 
interpretation of the resolutions predecessor must be done. The preamble of resolution 841 
also mentions as reasons: "the incidence of humanitarian crisis, including mass displace-
ments of population", and the "climate of fear of persecution and economic dislocation 
which could increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member 
states". Concern has been expressed to the value of SCR preambles so these reasons cannot 
be applied without scrutiny.
122
  
 
The refugee argument is at least "arguable" as justification though the numbers of refu-
gees are small in comparison to the situation in Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda.123 The other 
reasons are purely internal with regards to consequences. Various commentators have 
also questioned the legality as quoted in Chesterman.124 
 
The later resolution 1542 noted that the situation in Haiti "continues to constitute a 
threat to the international peace and security in the region"125, though the facts of the 
situation had not changed substantially. It seems that these facts have been "fitted" to 
the Article and not applied in their natural state. This is certainly a way of legitimizing 
SC action but perhaps in a factitious and misleading way. And "this is clearly an atypi-
cal conception of a threat to the international peace and security."126 
 
                                                 
 
121
 S/RES/1529, 29 February 2004. para. 3 
122
 See note n 33 above 
123
 Chesterman (2001) p. 153 
124
 l.c. 
125
 S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004. para. 10 
126
 Chesterman (2001) p. 153 
 32 
Schelling brings the question up to a new level when he asks whether "some collective 
and formally integrated attack on [global] issues can do a better job than coping piece-
meal, ad hoc, unilaterally, opportunistically."127 All in all these resolutions show the SC 
has stretched both concept and wording of the "threat to the peace" condition. 
 
3.2.6 Partial conclusions 
Our opening question was whether a "threat to the peace" can cover more than merely in-
ter-state conflicts based on the SC's practice. A textual interpretation in the light of the ob-
ject of purpose of the Charter arguably gives little room for such an expanded view. And 
the SC itself has previously "rejected jurisdiction when involvement would have infringed 
matters that did not have clear international repercussions…"128 But there is still an added 
dilemma between balancing sovereignty and the enhanced status of human rights.
129
  
 
Is there any 'common thread' within the resolutions discussed here? The extraordinary cir-
cumstances in Somalia make for a less interesting comparison, but the others?  On the one 
side of the spectre you have the Yugoslavia conflict, which positively seems to be on more 
solid grounds due to the level of aggression. This of course is debatable and one must note 
that there are not huge differences but shades that separate these resolutions. 
 
On the other side you have for example Iraq, where an argument for the refugee point was 
made but where the share lack of aggression was apparent. The SC also expressed they 
were "gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population" and "deeply 
disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering". In Rwanda the SC condemned the 
killings of civilians and breaches of humanitarian law. Resolution 1529 concerning Haiti 
expressed "utmost concern" for violence in Haiti and rapid deterioration of the "humanitar-
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ian situation". A pattern of basing resolutions on grave humanitarian disasters seems evi-
dent though formally expressed as the possible effects those disasters could have towards 
the peace of "the region".
130
 Somalia being the clearest example of a clear departure from 
the wording though Iraq, Rwanda and Haiti also fuel this way of reasoning.  
 
But are human rights violations themselves a "threat to the peace" or their possible conse-
quences? The discussed practices show the focus lies mainly on the "consequences" and 
not on the acts themselves, most prominently shown in the Iraq conflict with the repression 
of Kurds.  
 
One could also view the opening question from a different angle like Fassbender does. He 
argues the evolution of human rights shows that this no longer can be considered an inter-
nal matter only, and therefore does not affect the prohibition of domestic intervention.
131
 
The SC's practice gives this view considerable weight as they often argue towards the 
cross-border effects of human rights violations.  
 
He further argues that respect for human rights are now an erga omnes obligation and in-
ternal armed conflicts are already regulated by the law of armed conflict, "hence not a mat-
ter of domestic jurisdiction."
132
 These additional arguments give further weight to his rea-
soning of accepting that human rights conflicts can have implications beyond their starting 
grounds. But instead of arguing that the condition itself has expanded, his view regards the 
conflicts and their evolution. From being regarded as something belonging to a state's do-
mestic jurisdiction, to now being a concern of the international community as a whole. 
 
Either one concludes that the condition has expanded by practice or the conflicts them-
selves have evolved, the resolutions outlined here: "illustrate the broadening of the notion 
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of threat to the peace"
133
 and that the SC does not consider its mandate to be limited to in-
ter-State conflicts.
134
  
 
3.3 Applying Article 39 to the conflict 
3.3.1.1 Resolution 1970 
Both resolutions were applied under Chapter VII of the Charter as a response to a "threat to 
the peace."
135
 However, only resolution 1973 had a "determination" of the situation 
amounting to that threat level. The condition of "determining" a situation was previously 
discussed above and must be regarded as having little importance. It will therefore not be 
pursued.  
 
Beginning with resolution 1970, no direct link seems visible between a reason and the ap-
plication of Art. 39. But the resolution is not lacking of possible reasons as such. These 
reasons have therefore been divided and put into three separate brackets for an overview: 
 
1. A cross border refugee argument: 
 "plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" 
 
2. Arguments based on humanitarian grounds: 
 "condemning the violence and use of force against civilians" 
 "considering it to amount to crimes against humanity" 
 "gross and systematic violation of human rights" 
 "rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the ci-
vilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government" 
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3. An argument possible based on the R2P doctrine: 
 "the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect its population" 
 
Starting with the refugee argument, it is at least arguable that refugees could threaten the 
peace in neighbouring states if large numbers were to follow. However, the resolution does 
not give any clear indication to the fact that we are dealing with either minor or large 
amounts of refugees. The word "plight" meaning "dangerous" or "difficult" by its ordinary 
use might be an indication of a high number.  On the other hand, it might simply be to-
wards the dangerous journey that refugees must undertake to be able to cross into neigh-
bouring states, these are uncertainties.   
 
Another initial thought could be to view this argument as a "safety valve" of sorts regarding 
the resolutions legality. By throwing it in the mix of arguments, it at least strengthens the 
authorizations legitimacy externally, even though the argument itself seems dubious at best. 
This is apparent when one views all these arguments together since the refugee argument 
stands out. It has a stronger legal base compared to the others by it fitting a more classic 
approach to a "threat to the peace" and also corresponds well with Iraq and Haiti and the 
value of cross border refugees in those conflicts. 
 
An overwhelming amount of arguments evidently belong to the second bracket and con-
cern grave breaches of human rights within Libya. When 4/6 main arguments solely con-
cern themselves with human rights, they cannot be disregarded and must be viewed as a 
clear statement of their importance. This argument also corresponds with the previously 
outlined trend of the SC now accepting humanitarian concerns as international elements 
and not only belonging to a state's domestic jurisdiction.  
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Fassbender has previously argued in this direction
136
 and his arguments can find them-
selves strengthened by the adoption of this resolution. The evolution of "peace" from con-
taining a mere negative definition to now also having positive elements is also shown by 
this reasoning, since the humanitarian concerns seem to be the main justification for apply-
ing Art. 39.  
 
The third and last bracket is seemingly a direct reference to the R2P doctrine and the "Lib-
yan authorities" responsibility to act. The crimes within Libya clearly fall under the catego-
ry of "crimes against humanity" as defined through the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.
137
 The SC also said they considered the crimes in Libya to amount to this 
level.
138
 The international community had also tried and failed with its non-forceful 
measures as the second pillar of the R2P proscribes, meaning that appropriate action within 
Chapter VII must be taken.  
 
Viewing these brackets separately, their reasons could arguably be said to be lacking the 
necessary level needed for SC authorization. This argument is strengthened when viewed 
strictly from a traditional angle. But read as a whole, and with a broadened concept of 
"peace" in mind, it is clear that they together suffice as a "threat to the peace" in the light of 
the Charter and newer practice. Focusing on the R2P doctrine, though perhaps not a legal 
norm itself, it is met if one accepts that domestic breaches of human rights are experiencing 
"internationalisation". 
 
3.3.1.2 Resolution 1973 
The SC determined the situation "continued" to constitute a threat to the international peace 
and security as Art. 39 prescribes. It further reiterated the importance of the R2P doctrine 
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and the concern for refugees while also condemning grave breaches of humanitarian law. 
Since the situation was found to be deteriorating, the SC authorized military force. The 
justification was stronger at this stage because of the deteriorating situation and by conse-
quence a heightened threat level. New reasons were also added to this resolution but taking 
into consideration all the circumstances, they do not add any significant value to the totality 
of the justification.  
 
3.4 Final conclusions to Chapter Three 
The first objective of this thesis was to see if the SC had acted within their prescribed pow-
ers when finding the situation in Libya amounted to a "threat to the peace."  One of the 
opening remarks questioned if the conflict in Libya could be viewed in an international 
light when it appeared to have domestic limitations attached to it. An easy approach to this 
question would be to jump directly on the refugee argument and conclude that refugees 
clearly have international repercussions and therefore these authorizations must be lawful.  
 
The problem with choosing such a narrow approach is one could miss the broader picture 
so one cannot stop at this point. SCR's are unique in the sense that their creation demands 
tremendous political support from all corners of the world and careful consideration from 
those granting it. And even though they cannot be characterised as typical legal documents, 
possible consequences deriving from such resolutions are without precedent. A pure textual 
and rigid interpretation has proven to be less fruitful when applying the rules of legality on 
these authorizations as they demand a wider understanding.  
 
When moving beyond the two resolutions at hand, their predecessors have clearly shown 
the on-going evolution of human rights as a concept and its increasing importance on the 
international arena. Not forgetting these resolutions themselves contribute to the growing 
understanding and broadening of the concept. One must neither forget that these resolutions 
have taken a step further by acknowledging the R2P doctrine, a theory that might evolve 
into something more tangible in time. This leads to the conclusion that the SC has acted 
within its legal powers when adopting these resolutions. 
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4 The legality of the military operations 
4.1 Moving from jus ad bellum to jus in bello 
Military action is considered a last resort when trying to resolve conflicts and is never a 
preferred choice by the parties involved. Its deployment shows the shortcomings of diplo-
matic measures and other peaceful tools of dispute settlement. One could say the use of 
force does not resolve a conflict as such, but rather end it. With the use of force follows a 
wide range of uncertainties, these relate inter alia to them being successful without a mas-
sive bloodshed. But consequences derived from use of force both can and will lead to loss 
of innocent lives, this is the only sure thing. A large responsibility therefore rests on the 
shoulders of each and every soldier deployed within a military mandate and their higher 
ranking officials. 
 
The first international response to the adoption of SCR 1973 came two days later with the 
deployment of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an operation which was not run by NATO but by 
a multinational coalition led by the United States. Officials of the U.S government said its 
goal was to "prevent further attacks by regime forces on Libyan citizens" and "degrade the 
ability of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime to resist a no-fly zone being implemented."139 
 
NATO first made its presence known on 22 March 2011 when it launched an operation to 
enforce the arms embargo. NATO ships stationed in the Mediterranean Sea were used to 
cut off the flow of weapons to Libya. This marked the beginning of Operation Unified Pro-
tector(OUP). The organisation further agreed to enforce the authorized no-fly zone on 24 
March before taking the sole command over the military operations on 31 March.
140
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NATO itself describes the OUP to be made up of three main components
141
: 
1. Enforcing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the transfer of arms, related 
materials and mercenaries to Libya  
2. Enforcing a no-fly zone to prevent aircrafts from bombing civilian targets 
3. Conducting air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attacks or threatening to at-
tack Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas 
 
These components are all within the legal limits of the authorization and leads to the ques-
tion of them actually being enforced within the frame of legality.  
 
There are two sets of rules that apply to this question. International humanitarian law is 
imposed on all parties to an armed conflict, meaning both al-Gaddafi and coalition forces 
are subjects to these principles of war.  NATO must therefore (1) act within the mandate 
and (2) the rules of IHL to be within their legal limits. An act could therefore be found to 
be in conformity with the mandate, but in breach of IHL and vice versa. A distinction be-
tween these rules will therefore have to be made. A violation either way makes the act un-
lawful. Legality therefore depends on the act being within the overlapping circles of both 
rule sets. 
 
Consequence attached to a violation also depends on which rule set is breached. The man-
date limits sanctions to those within the UN system, while a grave breach of IHL can lead 
the violation to be regarded as a war crime and pursued as such. Here the focus is not to-
wards the consequences of a breach, but rather the principle question of legality. To be able 
to answer this question, both the authorization and IHL must be interpreted and applied to 
NATO's acts.  
 
The next chapter will begin by interpreting the resolution extensively as it has many inter-
pretational concerns before Chapter 4.3 outlines the basic principles of IHL. Application of 
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both rule sets will be done in Chapter 4.4 by narrowing down the questions to those most 
doubtful concerning legality. 
 
4.2 Interpreting the mandate 
4.2.1 What are "all necessary measures"? 
Resolution 1973 authorized the use of "all necessary measures" to "protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including 
Bengazhi." The only clearly expressed exclusion regards a foreign occupation force on 
Libyan soil. 
142
  
 
An overview of conditions needed for forceful measures to be available: 
A "threat of attack" in Libya towards either: 
 Civilians, or 
 Civilian populated areas  
 
 
By using the words "all necessary measures", the SC has given a wide discretion to the 
coalition forces, including use of military force.
143
 But the link between the civilian ele-
ment and the measures shows this discretion is limited to measures needed to "protect civil-
ians" and "civilian populated areas" under "threat of attack." This means that forceful 
measures cannot be deployed towards any other aim or purpose besides the good of the 
civilian population. Taking military action with a different purpose in mind will be in direct 
violation of the Charter's principle of prohibiting force in Art. 2(4) and considered illegal.  
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"all necessary measures" 
Excluding: occupancy 
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4.2.2 What are "necessary" measures?  
This condition could be interpreted as "essential" or "only means possible". The argument 
being that military measures not essential in protecting the civilian objective fall outside the 
scope of authorization. An interpretation on this basis would be very limiting if not damag-
ing to the coalition forces. The more likely interpretation is to view the main intent behind 
the resolution as not limiting the measures as such, but rather the aim of which these 
measures may be deployed towards. With this view in hand, an argument could also be 
made that the choice of measures should be proportionate to achieve the civilian objec-
tive.
144
 This thought touches upon the rules of IHL, but is still a reasonable one considering 
the purpose behind the resolution is to protect civilians and not cause unnecessary damage. 
 
4.2.3 Who are "civilians"? 
The next question to ask is who is defined as "civilians" in this context and enjoy the pro-
tection as subjects since this is not defined in the mandate. The ordinary meaning implies 
someone outside of an armed conflict. Article. 50(1) in Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conven-
tions has a negative definition and states: 
A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Arti-
cle 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.
145
 
 
These categories refer mainly to prisoners of war and armed forces of a party. The proto-
cols applicability is based on 172 states currently being party to it, including Libya.
146
 Ci-
vilians are therefore people who have not taken up arms or joined armed forces on either 
side, the non-combatants.
147
 When in doubt whether or not a person should be classified a 
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civilian, that doubt shall go in the persons favour as shown in fine with Art.50(1).  Rebel 
forces therefore fall outside this definition and do not enjoy protection under the mandate. 
 
4.2.4 Geographical limitations? 
Shifting the focus to the protection element and specifically the alternative condition of 
"civilian populated areas", the mandate seems to set geographical limitations.
148
 This 
means that not only can collation forces protect civilians themselves, they may also protect 
the areas in which they reside.  
 
One clearly has the right to protect a populated area consisting solely of civilians, but what 
if this area is populated by a mix of both armed forces and civilians, does this change any-
thing? The wording itself has no limitations towards this question and read in the light of 
its object and purpose, areas consisting of both armed forces and civilians are also within 
the mandate. The only condition needed to be met is the area itself must to some degree be 
populated by civilians.  
 
A second scenario rises if the armed forces of a civilian populated area are the only ones 
being targeted by attacks. Does this impact the areas level of protection?  The question 
must again be answered within the same frame as the previous one. This scenario does not 
limit the mandate and shows one may protect cities where rebel forces are present and even 
cities held by rebels, provided that civilians also populate the area.
149
  
 
However, this does not allow for the protection of the whole population or all geographical 
regions, only those where the civilian element is present. An interesting aspect of the au-
thorization regards the expressed mentioning of the protection of Benghazi. This city is a 
civilian populated area and its mentioning immediately seems excessive, though it could be 
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evidence of its importance and viewed as a direct warning towards Al-Gaddafi forces pur-
suant of their announced attack.
150
 
 
4.2.5 What is a "threat of attack"? 
A precondition must be met before the collation forces can protect civilians or the areas in 
which they reside. They must be under "threat of attack." The threat part shows an attack 
needs not to be on-going, only the "threat" of such need be evident. Bearing in mind the 
uniqueness that SCR's represent, the previous and similar discussed condition of "threat to 
the peace" cannot be applied without further discussion. Interpreted in its ordinary mean-
ing, a "threat" means an intention to create hostilities. Resolution 1973 read as a whole 
shows the intention of the SC was to hinder hostilities towards the civilian population, and 
this also correlates with its ordinary meaning.  
 
But not any hostility is covered by a "threat of attack." The word attack is not defined with-
in the mandate nor the Charter. Its ordinary meaning comprises of aggressive action, usual-
ly accompanied by weapons or armed force towards someone or something, so what level 
of force is needed to meet the "attack" condition stated here?  
 
The individual and collective right to self-defence within the Charter contains a similar 
precondition of "armed attack."
151
 Interpreted as a single word, an "attack" is arguably 
made up of a lesser level of harm by it dropping the "armed" part. This approach however 
has its difficulties as its target area diverges from the situation in Libya, its transfer value is 
therefore limited. Reading "attack" with the intent of the SC in mind, a strong argument can 
be made in favour of interpreting it as the use of military force against civilians.
152
 The 
unlawful killings of civilians by the Libyan government and the SC condemning these ac-
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tions strengthen this argument. But determining when a "threat" exists must be based on 
"reasonable grounds."
153
 What reasonable grounds are gives warrants further discussions 
and questions, one of which will be pursued in the next sub chapter. 
 
4.2.5.1 Do military command centres represent a "threat"? 
These installations traditionally serve as nerve centres behind military operations but 
whether they themselves possess a threat of attack towards civilians is another question. A 
difference between those military assets causing actual damage and command centres is 
only the mentioned "actual damage." But the command centre still takes a dominating role 
in the chain of causation. One could therefore argue that having this leading role makes 
them legitimate targets as removing them would possibly cripple the Libyan military forc-
es, or at least obstruct them from threatening the civilian objectives in the mandate. 
 
Against this an argument could be made that command centres being part of a military op-
erations can never themselves possess "a threat of attack" in its ordinary meaning. Even 
though they are usually found in the very beginning of the chain of causation, they only 
give orders, not act on them. Placing these arguments head to head, the stronger side based 
on the SC's intention is to view command centres as part of a bigger military operation. By 
wounding this part of the operation, civilian lives could possibly be saved and this must be 
given decisive weight. 
 
4.2.6 Can ground forces be used? 
Foreign occupation occurs when a state exercises "effective control" over the territory of 
another state without its consent.
154
 Focusing on the exclusion one could ask if ground 
forces deployed with the aim of protecting civilians from attacks fall within the term: "for-
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eign occupation force." Principally these groups have different aims and can therefore co-
exist without the threat of illegality. But if armed forces stay beyond their specific mis-
sion(s), one quickly moves closer to the limitations of the authorization. This assessment 
must be done towards all ground forces post mission completion.   
 
4.2.7 Can arms be sent to the rebels?   
This is an interesting question when viewed under the current arms embargo imposed by 
resolution 1970 and continued with resolution 1973. The latter allows for all necessary 
measures used "notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011)" which is the arms 
embargo.  
 
The arms embargo forbids the "sale" or "transfer" of arms and related material from states 
to Libya but with three exceptions: 
a) Non-lethal items may be supplied solely for "humanitarian" or "protective use". 
b) Protective clothing taken to Libya by UN personnel, media representatives and hu-
manitarian workers. 
c) Approved sales or supplies of arms by the Committee. 
 
This arms-embargo shows that supplying lethal weapons would be illegal as the exception 
only concerns "non-lethal items." This makes for a discussion towards the legality of sup-
plying "non-lethal items." 
 
First one must define what "non-lethal items" are. The word "item" being broader than 
weapon, but the most relevant part of "item" in this discussion is weapons. Non-lethal 
weapons differ from ordinary weapons due to the fact that their main goal is not to take 
lives, but rather minimize the risk of causality without the item losing efficiency. Some 
non-lethal items are for protection only while others have attacking capabilities. Tear gas, 
electroshock weapons and guns shooting rubber bullets are typical non-lethal weapons.  
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One could argue that supplying rebel forces can never be defined as something "solely hu-
manitarian" as these are middle men with their own agenda. The main opposing argument 
being that supplying rebels with such items would provide a more effective tool for the 
protection of civilians and civilian populated areas.  
 
The alternative condition of "protective use" might give grounds for a wider interpretation 
but when read in context, it does not contain a strong argument towards such a widening 
approach. Paragraph 9 which imposes the arms embargo has a goal of stopping the flow of 
military items to Libya, and thereof loss of lives caused by them. Exceptions e.g. regard 
humanitarian and technical assistance. When protective use is placed between these exam-
ples it is difficult to assign it any meaning outside the humanitarian context. When these 
are the arguments, the position seemingly lying closest to both the intent of the SC and con-
text is the one regarding supplying such arms as illegal actions, but this is a debatable con-
clusion. 
 
4.2.8 Targeting Colonel Mu'hammar al-Gaddafi personally?   
Coalition forces can only have one intention in mind when executing their mandate. This is 
as mentioned the protection of the civilian element. If targeting al-Gaddafi is viewed as a 
new objective, one could dismiss it immediately as being unlawful. But one could also use 
the same arguments as with the military command centres and say that al-Gaddafi is part of 
a bigger military scheme as the person primarily responsible for the threats against civil-
ians. This is clear when he is regarded commander of Libya’s armed forces. And removing 
him from the equation could mean reducing the threat level against civilians equally.  
 
One cannot dismiss the fact that one of his sons could resume command if he would die 
and that this would strongly diminish the overall effects of losing him. Though the symbol-
ic value of removing al-Gaddafi as head of state is arguably strong, this aim in itself does 
not constitute a legitimate aim within the mandate as he must pose a reasonable threat to 
civilians. U.S Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates has been quoted saying: 
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"Well, I think that it’s important that we operate within the mandate of the U.N. Security Council 
resolution. This is a very diverse coalition and the one thing that there is common agreement on are 
the terms set forth in the Security Council resolution. If we start adding additional objectives, then I 
think we create a problem in that respect. I also think that it is unwise to set as specific goals, things 
that you may or may not be able to achieve. "
155
 
 
By saying it could "create a problem" when adding "additional objectives" shows an argu-
ment in favour of regarding al-Gaddafi as not being a legitimate target, but these words do 
not expressly rule out the possibility either as they are lacking in precision.  
 
The British Secretary of State for Defence has said that targeting al-Gaddafi "would poten-
tially be a possibility."
156
 His position is much stronger compared to the U.S stance in rec-
ognizing this option. A split opinion within the British government must also be noted be-
tween Prime Minister David Cameron in favour, whilst the chief of the defence staff, Sir 
David Richards has opposed such a notion, thus making clarification essential.
157
  
 
An article published on 14 April 2011 by Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sar-
kozy gave even more doubt to the question by first saying the aim of the mandate "is not to 
remove Qaddafi by force" but that it is "impossible to imagine a future for Libya with 
Qaddafi in power."158 These arguments go in completely different directions. What 
might be extracted from this article is that legalistically the mandate limits such ac-
tions, but realistically the coalition forces view such measures as necessary to secure 
future peace in Libya. 
 
The above mentioned arguments show there is no clear answer available as even the lead-
ers of the coalition forces cast doubt on the question. As a single person it is difficult to 
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argue that al-Gaddafi is a legitimate target within the mandate. The symbolic value of re-
moving him seems far greater than the level of threat he himself poses towards the civilian 
population.  
 
But if one were to view al-Gaddafi as a reasonable threat, one must also consider the level 
of threat he poses at the time of an eventual attack sinc this level might increase or decrease 
as the conflict develops. After all, there is a difference between a man fleeing the country 
and a man still in charge of armed forces.  
 
Just being in charge is different from the likes of military command centres as these seem 
far more important in the chain of causation towards attacking civilians. These centres plan 
and give order continually which is different from al-Gaddafi, assumed he is giving direct 
orders, as he is unlikely to operate to the same extent and scale as these facilities do. This 
assumption gives grounds to regard targeting Colonel Mu'hammar al-Gaddafi personally as 
unlawful and the conclusion to this ambiguous question.  
 
4.3 General principles of international humanitarian law 
The powers to use "all necessary measures" must also be applied within the rules of IHL to 
be lawful. Applicable law includes The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Proto-
col 1 for Libya and most participating NATO states. The United States though not formally 
part of Additional Protocol 1 are still bound by it, as it is regarded as international custom-
ary law.
159
 Article 48 of Additional Protocol 1 states the basic rule: 
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Par-
ties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives." 
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Distinguishing between civilians and combatants must therefore be done at all times for 
military actions to be lawful. Failing to do so will amount to regarding such acts as indis-
criminate and illegal as stated in Art. 51(4).  
 
Article 51(2) and 52(2) further specifies that civilians "shall not" be the object of "attack" 
and that attacks shall be "limited strictly" to "military objectives." This shows that civilian 
causalities do not necessarily amount to unlawful acts. Only the specific targeting of civil-
ians is unlawful. In this context "attacks" are defined in Art. 49(1) as "acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence." While article 52(2) defines "mili-
tary objectives" as objects giving "effective contribution to military action" and where its 
destruction offers a "definite military advantage."  
 
By adding a "definite military advantage" to the definition, one cannot attack all military 
objects arguing there is some kind of military advantage to be gained, there must be "con-
crete and perceptible military advantage."
160
 There must also be a "definite" proven ad-
vantage. Attacks based on a "likely" or "probable" advantages falling outside this scope. 
 
Article 51(5)(a) and (b) expands the notion of indiscriminate attacks by first adding that 
bombing military objectives with a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects is 
forbidden. And secondly, that one must always view the concrete and direct anticipated 
"military advantage" as loss of civilian lives could be excessive compared to this gain, 
making disproportionate measures fall within the definition of indiscriminate attacks and 
thus unlawful.  
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A general rule of precaution is also in force through Art. 57. This rule compels the parties 
to take a high level of care to minimize incidental loss of civilian lives. These measures 
include "all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack" as stated in 
57(2)(ii). 
 
4.4 Applying the limits of the mandate and the rules of IHL 
An extensive interpenetration of the mandate as well as an outline of some of the basic 
principles of IHL has now been done. This next part has a narrower focus as it will concern 
itself solely with those acts lying closest to the limits of legality. The goal is not to focus on 
all possible violations, but those most doubtful and carrying the widest repercussions. Ac-
tions clearly falling within the mandate and IHL will not be addressed. 
 
4.4.1 Aiding rebel forces to facilitate regime change? 
Aiding rebels under IHL is not in principle an unlawful act, but the specific measures cho-
sen to support this aim might be. If NATO e.g. were to target military objects without a 
"definite military advantage" to try and help rebel forces, this would be in breach of IHL.  
 
The mandate is limited towards those measures needed in achieving protection of "civilians 
and civilian populated areas" under "threat of attack". Its aim was not to authorize a regime 
change in Libya, this is a crucial distinction.
161
 If NATO were to help and assist rebel forc-
es facilitate such a change without civilians being under a threat of attack, it would not be a 
legitimate aim within resolution 1973 and considered unlawful.  
 
On the other hand, one could argue that only by facilitating a regime change would civil-
ians be protected in the long run. This however does not change the fact that the mandate 
only allows for help when civilians are under "threat of attack". The BRICS nations have 
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repeatedly accused NATO of using the resolution as a cover to facilitate a regime change 
by aiding rebel forces.
162
  
 
As a rare response the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon has publicly stated that: 
"This military operation done by the NATO forces was strictly within (resolution) 1973."
163
 
NATO members like The United States and Great Britain have also supported Ban Ki-
moon's statement but this is only natural when being accused of unlawful acts. These di-
vided opinions show a conflict between those states executing the resolution on the one 
side, and those observing on the other.  
 
NATO did not only use airstrikes to wipe out command and control centres in Libya. When 
rebels reached territories held by Al-Gaddafi forces, NATO would launch air strikes in the 
same areas, effectively helping the rebels conquer new territories.
164
 This on-going support 
consequently led to the rebels overthrowing the regime. But NATO has denied these accu-
sations saying they have stuck to the mandate to protect civilian lives.
165
  
 
An argument could be made towards the airstrikes possibly being based on consent.
166
 
However, this will only have relevance if the rebel forces had obtained and effectively con-
trolled enough territory to be regarded as the new Libyan government. This condition is 
unlikely to have been met at the time the airstrikes were happening, since the aim was then 
to secure hostile territories so one could get territorial control. 
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But even if NATO itself has denied such accusations, the French have confirmed dropping 
weapons to rebel forces in Western Libya.
167
 Not forgetting arms dropped by Qatar, even 
though they are not a NATO member.
168
 Such actions are considered to be outside the 
mandate as previously discussed under chapter 4.2.7. Russia also viewed the supplies of 
arms to rebels as unlawful when Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said: "If this is confirmed, 
it is a very crude violation of UN Security Council resolution 1970".
169
 
 
A secret mission by the intervening states was also reported of being held separate from 
NATO's military command to ensure it did not compromise its mandate. Undercover help-
ers stationed within Libya would send intelligence back to NATO and train rebel forces.
 170
  
A formal acknowledgement of these "advisors" was done by French Foreign Minister Alain 
Juppe when he told a radio station that France had contributed "a few instructors" to train 
rebel fighters.
171
  
 
A diplomat given anonymity by the NY Times was quoted on saying: 
 “the learning curve for the rebels, with training and equipping, was increasing"172 
 
These sources together show the coalition forces have in fact supplied, trained and coordi-
nated attacks with rebel forces against the regime. These actions are outside of the mandate 
because the territories which they were advancing upon were not under "threat of attack" 
by their keepers but by the rebel forces themselves, meaning the rebels in a turn of events 
actually posed the "threat of attack" towards civilians and not Gaddafi forces.
173
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One could further argue the coalition forces choose sides by assisting rebels, a position not 
available by the neutral wording of the mandate. But on the other side, some have argued 
the resolution "hints" to taking sides by mentioning Benghazi specifically as this civilian 
populated city was under threat of attack.
174
 This however is not a very strong point when 
considering the eminent danger this city was put under by Al-Gaddafi forces prior to reso-
lution 1973.  
 
An answer confirming that NATO was aiding rebel forces to facilitate a regime change 
must therefore be given and consequently a breach of the mandate did happen. A branch of 
this question leads to the legality of targeting specific commanders of the regime, most 
prominent al-Gaddafi himself. 
 
4.4.2 The targeting of Colonel Mu'hammar al-Gaddafi 
Under IHL, Colonel Mu'hammar al-Gaddafi is clearly a lawful target as commander of 
Libya’s armed forces. The question of legality will therefore only concern the mandate.   
 
The conclusion under chapter 4.2.8 was that targeting al-Gaddafi personally was an unlaw-
ful act under the mandate.  NATO officials have later in the conflict viewed the resolution 
differently as allowing for such an attack and confirmed this.
175
 But viewing and acting are 
two different things and here the question of legality is solely towards the act itself. A 
source in favour of saying NATO acted outside the mandate came when a top U.S. admiral 
admitted that NATO was trying to kill al-Gaddafi.
176
 But no official statements concerning 
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the targeting of al-Gaddafi has ever been given by NATO. Quite the contrary as Lieuten-
ant-General Charles Bouchard, commander of NATO's Operation Unified Protector, said:  
"All Nato's targets are military in nature and have been clearly linked to the Gaddafi regime's sys-
tematic attacks on the Libyan population and populated areas. We do not target individuals."
177
 
 
There are reports claiming that missiles were fired into an al-Gaddafi compound only hours 
after he appeared on state television.
178
 A compound located just over a mile from the hotel 
in which the appearance was recorded.
179
 Assuming this is correct, there is a strong argu-
ment in favour of seeing the attack in connection with the television appearance and re-
garding this as a targeted attack.  
 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen opposed this argument saying “we do 
not target individuals, we target military capabilities that can be used to attack civilians,”180 
This therefore ends up as a question of which side one wants to believe. Not only have 
sources reported that NATO specifically targeted al-Gaddafi, a confirmation from Britain's 
Defence Minister Liam Fox towards coalition forces aiding rebel forces target al-Gaddafi 
was given when he stated: 
"I can confirm that NATO is providing intelligence and reconnaissance assets to the NTC (National 
Transitional Council) to help them track down Colonel Gaddafi and other remnants of the re-
gime,"
181
 
 
One could here argue that participation should not be viewed any different from the direct 
acts themselves, as this would be a too convenient way of going around the limits of the 
mandate. And also, complicity is treated the same way as the principal act in most parts of 
the world.  
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In conclusion, this factual question is a matter of credibility. While NATO has confirmed 
aiding rebels to track down al-Gaddafi which could be regarded unlawful, they have never 
expressed that they themselves have targeted him. But why would NATO confirm they 
view the mandate as allowing for the targeting of al-Gaddafi, and then deny acting upon it 
if they in fact did. This could be linked to the dubious nature of the legality of targeting 
Gaddafi. Or simply because the source that confirmed NATO's view was mistaken or 
wrong, considering this statement never came through official channels.
 182
 Its credibility is 
therefore lacking.  But the amount of sources in favour of NATO targeting Gaddafi is argu-
ably stronger than their on-going denial. Objectively the most probable course of events 
seems to be that NATO were targeting Gaddafi, which is unlawful under the present inter-
pretation of the authorization.  
 
4.4.3 Indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force?  
The mandate gives the power to use "all necessary measures" to achieve its objectives. This 
is therefore a question solely concerning the legality of IHL. A report published by Human 
Rights Watch examined eight NATO air strikes(incidents) in Libya that resulted in 72 civil-
ian deaths, including 20 women and 24 children.
183
 Four of these incidents leading to the 
deaths of 49 people will be the basis for answering this question and applied under the 
principles of IHL. 
 
August 8, 2011, 34 deaths. 
Four houses in Majer were hit by NATO air strikes this day, a place described as a "rural 
village" about 10 kilometres south of the town of Zliten. Human Rights Watch found no 
evidence of military activity at either of the compounds except one military-style shirt. 
They also found fins from a GBU-12 laser guided bomb at the site which proves the pilot 
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had the ability to guide the bomb, and that these houses most probably were the intended 
targets. NATO told HRW that these compounds were “legitimate military targets.”184 This 
was based on:  
“clear intelligence that the former farm buildings were being used as a staging point for pro-Qadhafi 
forces to conduct attacks against the people of Libya and the likelihood of civilians in the nearby vi-
cinity was low.”185  
 
However, as HRW point out, this statement has not yet been backed up by evidence. Bear-
ing in mind that NATO is the party closest to provide evidence legitimizing their actions, 
their lacking will to put forth such proof may be based on its non-existents. But the lacking 
will does not necessarily mean that these houses were not legitimate military targets either, 
though it undoubtedly fuels such a thought.  
 
The high number of civilian deaths makes one question if these bombs were proportionate 
to achieve their concrete and direct anticipated "military advantage." Without knowing 
what this advantage was, one cannot answer this question satisfactory. Assuming these 
compounds were staging points for troops, removing them and consequently killing this 
many civilians seems excessive compared to the advantage gained. Especially viewed from 
a civilian stand point since one did not know how many troops were stationed there, nor 
their readiness to attack. Unfortunately, no final conclusion can be made without further 
evidence.  
 
August 4, 2011. Three Deaths. 
A NATO bomb hit the house of Mustafa al-Morabit, a teacher in the town of Zlitin around 
6 a.m. This led to the collapse of the room where the woman and children of the family 
were sleeping, causing the deaths of his wife and two children. HRW reported the house 
next door had housed al-Gaddafi forces until two days before the attack, but that no evi-
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dence were found that Mustafa al-Morabit's house was used for a similar purpose. HRW 
said that such evidence could have "potentially" been moved.
186
 
 
As a response to these allegations, NATO told HRW that “the target building and buildings 
immediately adjacent to it were used exclusively by senior regime commanders as an active 
command and control facility directing forces in the Zliten area.” They therefore concluded 
that their actions were lawful.   
 
This brings up the question of "necessary precaution" towards verifying that the attacked 
house of Mustafa al-Morabit contained neither civilians nor civilian objects, but legitimate 
military objects as Art 57(2)(i) prescribes. HRW said "satellite imagery taken before the 
strike on August 3, shows no signs of military activity at or around the house." NATO has 
not provided evidence showing that they have met the level of precaution needed to be in 
conformity with IHL.  The unwillingness to provide clarification is apparent and once 
again fuels a thought of unlawful behaviour, but this cannot be confirmed. Assuming 
NATO has not taken any further steps to verify the target, this should be viewed as a 
breach of the principle. 
 
June 19, 2011. Five deaths. 
A residential area in Souk al-Juma was hit by a NATO air strike, which led to the deaths of 
five people. HRW visited the site and found no evidence of military activity and satellite 
imagery acquired on June 7 and 10 revealed no such signs either. NATO acknowledged 
their mistake but said they intended to hit a "military missile site" and blamed the miss on a 
systems malfunction due to "laser guidance problems".
187
 NATO later said “it was possible 
that the errant weapon had caused such casualties".
188
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Art 51(2) states that civilians shall not be the "object of attack." Assuming NATO's claim is 
correct, no mens rea towards attacking civilians means the air strike was not in violation of 
this article because civilians were not the intended "object of attack." Since NATO has not 
stated the concrete military advantage anticipated by the strike, it is not possible to discuss 
the element of disproportionate measures found in Art. 57(2)(a)(iii).  However, questioning 
if NATO had taken "all feasible precautions" in their "choice of means and methods of at-
tack" may be asked if one assumes the missile site was located in close vicinity to the resi-
dential area. If this was the case, an argument in favour of choosing ground troops instead 
of an air strike could be made because of the high possibility of civilian casualties if the air 
strike would miss.  
 
On the other hand, one could also argue a targeted air strike has a better level of succeeding 
without causing civilian lives compared to ground troops, as these strikes to some degree 
remove the human element of error. Technological advances in war fare also contribute to 
this argument as precision continuously gets better. In conclusion, it is doubtful if this 
strike was unlawful based on the assumptions above. 
 
September 16, 2011, Two Deaths.  
On this day a seven story apartment complex in Sirte called Imarat al-Tameen was struck 
by air strikes which led to the deaths of a pregnant nurse and a truck driver. Most of the 
families living there had already fled the apartment complex when the attacks started but 
some had stayed put.
189
 There were allegedly snipers placed on the roof prior to the attack. 
When HRW inspected the roof top post attack they found a "dozen spent rifle cartridges 
and remnants of a JDAM (satellite guided bomb)".
190
 In a passageway on the north side of 
the complex they also found a few discarded military uniforms. The rifle cartridges could 
have belonged to the alleged snipers but HRW could not determine if the cartridges were 
there prior to the NATO attack or not.   
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Snipers here would be legitimate military targets as they would be an "effective contribu-
tion to military action". But was the bombing of an apartment complex disproportionate to 
the gain of killing a few snipers? (the assumption based on a "dozen spent rifle cartridges" 
found). 
 
As a military asset, snipers pose a huge threat to visible civilians standing within the range 
of a snipers weapon. Snipers were also used previously by al-Gaddafi to shoot protesters in 
Benghazi.
191
 But compared to an apartment complex potentially full of civilians, the value 
seems disproportionate as Art 51(5)(b) regards the "expected" loss at the time of attack to 
be the key concern, not the actual loss. An apartment could potentially contain a whole 
family, and by it being a "complex" multiplies this assumption to a risk not worth taking 
when the gain seemingly deals with the removal of a "few" snipers. Therefore this appears 
to be a disproportionate bombing. 
 
4.5 Final conclusions to Chapter Four 
The questions above have all led to further discussions and the conclusions are debatable. 
Some of which have largely been based on assumptions, a necessity due to the lacking will 
or existence of evidence supplied by NATO. Legality as mentioned depends on an act be-
ing within the overlapping circles of both the mandate and IHL. This has not been the case 
for all of NATO's acts, though it must be said that they rarely have been in breach of both 
rule sets. This conclusion regards the degree of unlawfulness, rather than a simple yes or no 
answer of legality in itself. The conclusion based on the previous discussions is therefore 
that NATO to some degree has acted outside its legal limits and these acts must be regard-
ed as unlawful in international law. 
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5 Ending remarks 
The two principal questions concerning the legality of the intervention in Libya has led to a 
wide range of interpretational discussions and concerns, though the most important human-
itarian question stands yet unanswered.  Resolutions 1970 and 1973 both aimed to protect 
the civilian population in Libya, but did the collation forces succeed in meeting this aim?  
 
In the aftermath of the conflict, widespread suspicion has led to suspected pro al-Gaddafi 
fighters and loyalists being tortured and killed.
192
 Amnesty has also reported that militia's 
now one year after roam Libya committing human rights abuses and war crimes.
193
 This 
shows that Libyans yet again must fight for justice. And that the removal of one tyrant does 
not necessarily mean that peace naturally follows. This is a gradual process where taking 
one step at a time is the only way to move forward. It all boils down to the conflict in Libya 
having deeper roots to its cause than the surface indicated. 
 
When viewing both the authorization and execution through the eyes of the law, a grave 
concern regards the possible damage caused by the sometimes "missing link" between 
them. A missing link which might shackle the Security Council's powers by future vetoes.  
If similar humanitarian disasters were to come on their radar, those states opposing an ini-
tial intervention would now have even more strength behind their arguments by pointing to 
Libya and the illegal expenditure of the mandate. This is apparent as many states have de-
manded an investigation into the legality of the actions by NATO.
194
  
 
Protecting ones civilians in times of war is both essential and necessary. A state's responsi-
bility to act on this thought which led to the adoption of the R2P doctrine may also have 
suffered from the execution of resolution 1973. The authorization pointing to the R2P doc-
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trine and its departing execution may thus have given irreparable damage to this growing 
concept. How much damage it has suffered is yet to be discovered.  
 
Cicero once aptly said: "Ut sementem feceris, its metes." And as you sow, so shall you reap 
might be a notion that will follow future coalition forces wanting to intervene when human-
itarian disasters develop, effectively hindering help to those most in need. 
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